Patent Infringement in Personalized Medicine: Limitations of the Existing Exemption Mechanisms by Kim, Jiyeon
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 96 Issue 3 
2018 
Patent Infringement in Personalized Medicine: Limitations of the 
Existing Exemption Mechanisms 
Jiyeon Kim 
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment Commons, Bioethics 
and Medical Ethics Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, 
Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jiyeon Kim, Patent Infringement in Personalized Medicine: Limitations of the Existing Exemption 
Mechanisms, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 623 (2018). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
623 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: 
LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING EXEMPTION 
MECHANISMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. X suffers from recurrent glioblastoma, a type of deadly brain cancer. 
One of his physicians reads a study reporting a novel immunotherapy, which 
uses the chimeric antigen receptor T cell (CAR-T) technology, leading to 
regression of glioblastoma in a small number of patients.1 Although the 
therapy has recently been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and is now offered by two major pharmaceutical 
companies, 2  it is only approved for certain hematological cancers. 3  In 
addition, Mr. X’s cancer does not express the biomarker that is necessary 
for the CAR-T therapy used in the published glioblastoma trial.4 Fortunately, 
the physicians are aware of a research laboratory at the university associated 
with the medical center that has expertise on the technologies associated 
with the CAR-T immunotherapy as well as certain biomarkers associated 
with Mr. X’s cancer.5 In collaboration with the laboratory’s researchers, Mr. 
X’s physicians conduct a small clinical trial administering an experimental 
CAR-T therapy to Mr. X and other glioblastoma patients, for whom this 
clinical trial was their only remaining hope. Later, one of the pharmaceutical 
companies holding multiple CAR-T patents sues the physicians, researchers, 
and academic institution for patent infringement.  
This hypothetical scenario involving the first FDA-approved gene 
therapy, CAR-T therapy,6 illustrates a potential patent infringement lawsuit 
that might occur more frequently as we enter the new era of personalized 
                                                 
1. Christine E. Brown et al., Regression of Glioblastoma after Chimeric Antigen Receptor T-
Cell Therapy, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2561 (2016). 
2. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the United States (Aug. 
30, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm574058.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/4C8Z-3DGD] [hereinafter FDA Press Release on Kymriah]; Press Release, FDA, FDA 
Approves CAR-T Cell Therapy to Treat Adults with Certain Types of Large B-cell Lymphoma (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm581216.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/NQ8J-D9G8] [hereinafter FDA Press Release on Yescarta]. 
3. Supra note 2. While it is possible for Mr. X’s physicians to use the CAR-T therapy “off-
label,” see “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices–
Information Sheet, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm [http 
s://perma.cc/W66S-8N2U] (last updated July 12, 2018), the CAR-T cells in the FDA-approved therapy 
would not target the glioblastoma cells.  
4. See Brown et al., supra note 1, at 2562.  
5. See, e.g., David Chen & James Yang, Development of Novel Antigen Receptors for CAR T-
cell Therapy Directed Toward Solid Malignancies, 187 TRANSLATIONAL RES. 11, 14 (2017). 
6. See supra note 2. 
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and precision medicine.7 The beauty and power of personalized medicine is 
that it is inherently experimental and innovative. Naturally, therapies in 
personalized medicine are built upon many patented technologies. Thus, 
underlying these novel therapies is the potential for alleged patent 
infringement by the physicians and researchers who experiment with and 
personalize the therapy in order to cure patients and save their lives.  
This Note uses the CAR-T therapy as a case study to examine the unique 
challenges that patent law faces in the dawn of the personalized medicine 
era, particularly regarding patent infringement. Specifically, this Note 
inquires whether a use of patented medical therapy8 related to a clinical 
experiment or trial by physicians, researchers, and academic institutions for 
the purpose of patient treatment renders them liable for patent infringement. 
Patent law confers exclusive rights to inventors and allows them to enforce 
those rights associated with a specific patent by bringing a patent 
infringement claim against the alleged infringer. 9  At the same time, 
however, patent law also permits certain unauthorized uses of patented 
inventions to be exempted from infringement challenges or infringement 
liability.10 There are two key defenses under which an alleged infringer can 
be exempted: one provides exemption largely based on the status11 of the 
alleged infringer (“medical procedure exemption”)12 and the other based on 
the nature or purpose of the alleged infringing use (“experimental use 
exemption”). 13  This Note analyzes whether the two exemptions indeed 
provide effective immunity from patent infringement or infringement 
liability for physicians, researchers, and academic institutions involved in 
the use of experimental therapies in the personalized medicine era.  
Analysis of the statutory text, legislative history, and case law of the 
medical procedure exemption reveals that the “biotechnology patents” 
exception renders the provision ineffective for infringement lawsuits 
involving CAR-T therapy.14 Therefore, this Note argues that the medical 
procedure exemption is incompatible with the personalized medicine era.15 
                                                 
7. In fact, the National Institute of Health (NIH) is continuing to push for precision medicine, 
expecting “the golden age of immunotherapies . . . .” Jeannie Baumann, Breakthroughs Expected from 
NIH Precision Medicine Push, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/prod 
uct/blaw/document/XBC8EMEO000000. 
8. This includes both product patents and method patents regarding the therapy. 
9. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02 (Matthew Bender 2018). 
10. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018 n.6 (1989). 
11. The statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012), also addresses the nature of the alleged 
infringing activity. See infra Part II.A. 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); see infra Part II for further discussion.  
13. Based on common law experimental use doctrine and statutory provision 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1); see infra Part III for further discussion. 
14. See infra Parts II.A–C. 
15. See infra Part II.D. 
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Meanwhile, the experimental use exemption bifurcates into a narrow 
common law doctrine 16  and a statutory provision that is interpreted 
relatively broadly when related to FDA submission. 17  However, it is 
ambiguous whether a clinical trial would be considered as an “experimental 
use” under the narrow common law experimental use doctrine and whether 
the statutory experimental use exemption would permit uses that might not 
have any realistic potential for FDA submission.18 While many scholars 
have argued for a broad experimental use doctrine, the discussions have 
remained largely in the context of basic science. 19 This Note presents a 
novel argument for a broad experimental use doctrine in the context of 
personalized medicine and suggests that the new era of personalized 
medicine calls for an additional factor in the experimental use analysis—
clinical trials and experiments that cure and save patients’ lives.20  
Part I provides an overview of the CAR-T immunotherapy as a model 
therapy representing personalized medicine and presents the issue of patent 
infringement. Part II examines the medical procedure exemption and 
analyzes its effectiveness as a defense to patent infringement liability 
involving CAR-T patents. Then, Part III turns to the experimental use 
exemption, examines its effectiveness for providing immunity from CAR-
T patent infringement, and concludes by arguing for a broader experimental 
use doctrine for the personalized medicine era.  
I. PERSONALIZED MEDICINE AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT  
A. CAR-T Therapy: The First FDA-Approved Gene Therapy Heralding 
the Personalized Medicine Era 
The new era of personalized medicine and health care is marked by the 
Precision Medicine Initiative21 and the 21st Century Cures Act of 2016,22 
aiming to incorporate innovative diagnostics and therapies tailored to 
                                                 
16. See infra Part III.A. 
17. See infra Part III.B. 
18. See infra Part III.C. 
19. See infra Part III.D.1. 
20. See infra Part III.D.3. 
21. The Precision Medicine Initiative is a long-term research effort to revolutionize the 
understanding of health and disease by investigating how an individual’s genetics, environment, and 
lifestyle can elucidate the best approach to prevent or treat diseases. See The Precision Medicine 
Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/precision-medicine [https://perma 
.cc/44DM-V63E]; see also Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015). 
22. The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) aims to accelerate the development of innovative 
medical therapies and bring those advances to patients more efficiently. Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 
1033 (2016). 
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individual patients into the health care practice. Under this movement, 
cancer immunotherapy has advanced exponentially as a prototype 
embodying the idea of personalized medicine.23 At the forefront is a therapy 
that utilizes a cancer patient’s own immune cells, genetically modifies them 
to recognize cancer cells, and places those modified cells back into the 
patient’s body to attack the cancer—chimeric antigen receptor T cell (CAR-
T) therapy. 24  This novel therapy has successfully treated 25  previously 
incurable cancers such as advanced chronic lymphoid leukemia (CLL)26 and 
acute lymphoid leukemia (ALL).27  
In addition to being in the media spotlight for its efficacy in treating 
cancer, the CAR-T therapy has also been at the center of patent battles 
between pharmaceutical companies and academic institutions. 28  The 
number of patents involving the CAR-T technology is already staggering 
and continues to grow.29 And, on August 30, 2017, CAR-T surprised the 
world again when the FDA approved Novartis’s CAR-T therapy—
Kymriah—for the treatment of ALL in pediatric and young adult patients,30 
making it the first FDA-approved gene therapy.31 Subsequently, the FDA 
approved a second CAR-T therapy—Yescarta—to Kite Pharma, Inc.32 for 
                                                 
23. See Alice Park, What If Your Immune System Could Be Taught to Kill Cancer?, TIME (Mar. 
24, 2016), http://time.com/4270345/what-if-your-immune-system-could-be-taught-to-kill-cancer./ [http 
s://perma.cc/4AZ8-WPY8]; Denise Grady, Harnessing the Immune System to Fight Cancer, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/health/harnessing-the-immune-system-to-fight-
cancer.html. 
24. Lisa Rosenbaum, Tragedy, Perseverance, and Chance — The Story of CAR-T Therapy, 377 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1313 (2017). 
25. To be accurate, the patients have achieved “remission” of the disease.  
26. David L. Porter et al., Chimeric Antigen Receptor–Modified T Cells in Chronic Lymphoid 
Leukemia, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 725 (2011).  
27. Stephan A. Grupp et al., Chimeric Antigen Receptor–Modified T Cells for Acute Lymphoid 
Leukemia, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (2013). 
28. See, e.g., Kurt Orzeck, Novartis to Pay $12.3M, Royalties to End IP Row with Juno, LAW 
360 (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/639776/novartis-to-pay-12-3m-royalties-to-end-
ip-row-with-juno; Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., No. 16–1243–RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90445 (D. Del. June 13, 2017); In re Juno Therapeutics, Inc., No. C16–1069RSM, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 91608 (W.D. Wash. June 14, 2017); Trs. of the Univ. of Pa. v. St. Jude Children’s Research 
Hosp., No. 13–1502, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193965 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014). 
29. Search of patents containing the terms “CAR-T” and “immunotherapy” in Westlaw yielded 
322 issued patents and 1,079 patent applications. All patents and applications were checked for relevance 
by assessing claims (last searched on Sept. 30, 2018).  
30. See FDA Press Release on Kymriah, supra note 2.  
31. Denise Grady, F.D.A. Approves First Gene-Altering Leukemia Treatment, Costing $475,000, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/health/gene-therapy-cancer.html. 
The high price of the therapy has been heavily discussed and criticized in the wake of the FDA approval. 
See, e.g., John Lauerman & James Paton, Novartis’s $475,000 Price on Cancer Therapy Meets 
Resistance, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/docume 
nt/XCDLUUG4000000. 
32. Gilead Sciences Inc. now owns the FDA-approved CAR-T therapy since its acquisition of 
Kite Pharma Inc. Caroline Chen, Gilead Gets FDA Approval for Kite’s Novel Cancer Therapy, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X31GP8R4000000.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2018] PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 627 
 
 
 
  
the treatment of large B-cell lymphoma in adult patients.33 Heralding the era 
of personalized medicine, FDA approval of CAR-T therapy provides 
promise for the field of genetic engineering and gene therapy. 
However, this unconventional drug raises novel questions. Compared to 
a traditional drug with a fixed chemical composition, CAR-T therapy 
utilizes a patient’s own immune cells, and, thus, there is a wide range of 
efficacy and toxicity.34 Many detailed aspects of the CAR-T therapy remain 
unknown, requiring more clinical trials and experimentations. Also, while 
the therapy thus far has been successful mostly in hematological cancers, 
there is excitement for the application of CAR-T therapy in other solid 
cancers.35 These aspects, potential for new discovery and application, can 
in fact be considered as characteristics of therapies in personalized medicine 
that are tailored to individual patients and are often based on cutting-edge 
biotechnology with ample possibilities for future applications. These 
therapies are inherently experimental and, thus, potently innovative. All this 
therapeutic potential, in turn, harbors potential for patent infringement: a 
physician, a researcher, or an academic institution using and experimenting 
with the CAR-T therapy to treat more patients and cure more diseases could 
become liable for patent infringement. 
B. Patent Infringement and Exemption from Infringement  
United States patent laws confer an exclusive right to make, use, or sell 
an invention for twenty years36 to achieve the constitutional prerogative 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”37 The patentee has 
“the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention,”38 regardless of the alleged infringer’s intention or access to 
the invention.39 Despite the seemingly unqualified rights of the patentee, 
patent statutes allow certain unauthorized uses of a patented invention by 
providing exemption from patent infringement or liability.40 Conceptually, 
these statutes can be categorized as providing an exemption based on either 
the alleged infringer’s special status or the special nature or purpose of the 
infringing act. Indeed, for physicians, researchers, and academic institutions 
                                                 
33. See FDA Press Release on Yescarta, supra note 2. 
34. See Sattva S. Neelapu et al., Chimeric Antigen Receptor T-cell Therapy—Assessment and 
Management of Toxicities, 15 NATURE REVS. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 47 (2018). 
35. See Babak Moghimi & David Barrett, CAR T Cells for Solid Tumors, 3 CURRENT STEM CELL 
REPS. 269 (2017).  
36. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). 
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
38. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
40. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(e)(1), 273, 287(c). 
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that become liable for patent infringement from using a patented medical 
therapy, such as CAR-T, patent law provides two sources of potential 
exemptions: 41  exemption from infringement liability for a medical 
practitioner’s medical activity 42  and exemption from infringement for 
experimental use of the invention.43  
II. 35 U.S.C. § 287(C): MEDICAL PROCEDURE EXEMPTION FROM PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 
This Part provides a brief legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c),44 the 
so-called “medical procedure exemption” provision, and reviews the case 
law interpreting the statute. It proceeds to an analysis of whether a physician, 
researcher, or academic institution using the CAR-T therapy will qualify 
under § 287(c) for immunity from infringement liability and concludes by 
arguing that the provision is incompatible with the personalized medicine 
era. 
A. Legislative History and Text of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)  
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was enacted to exempt medical professionals from 
patent infringement liability when performing a medical or surgical 
procedure involving the patent in dispute.45 The instigating case, Pallin v. 
Singer,46 involved a dispute over a patent claiming a new process of making 
sutureless incisions in cataract surgery.47 Dr. Samuel Pallin, a surgeon, sued 
several other surgeons, including Dr. Jack Singer, for infringement of his 
patent on the new technique. 48  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, alleging that the patent was invalid.49 The district court denied 
summary judgment50 but ultimately entered a consent order stating that four 
                                                 
41. Another potential source of exemption, “defense to infringement based on prior commercial 
use,” codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273, does not apply to the question posed in this Note and, therefore, is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  
42. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
43. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1). 
44. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 67–68 (1996).  
45. See generally Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent 
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 331–37 (1997); Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical 
Practitioner “Process” Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 63–68 (1999); Leisa Talbert Peschel, Note, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 
U.S.C. §287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 306–09 (2008). 
46. 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995). 
47. Method of Making Self-Sealing Episcleral Incision, U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (filed June 
28, 1990) (issued Jan. 14, 1992). 
48. Pallin, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1051–52.  
49. Id. at 1051. 
50. Id. at 1053–54.  
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claims of the patent in controversy were invalid, and Pallin agreed not to 
enforce the other claims.51   
Although the case itself did not develop into further legal disputes, it 
fueled a debate on the patentability of medical and surgical procedures.52 In 
response, 53  several bills 54  proposing either a prohibition of medical 
procedure patents or a patent infringement liability exemption for 
physicians were introduced in both the House and the Senate, with the 
support of the medical community.55 Despite continued attempts, however, 
these bills failed to pass in the Senate.56 After the failure of Senate Bill 2105, 
interestingly, the core part of this bill was incorporated into House Bill 
361057 and fast-tracked to passage as a part of the Omnibus Consolidated 
Appropriation Act of 1997 without any formal debates.58 On September 30, 
1996, the President signed the bill containing an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 
287(c).59  
Subsection (1) of the medical procedure exemption provision provides 
that a “medical practitioner” or “related health care entity” is exempt from 
patent infringement liability in regards to performance of a “medical 
activity.”60 Subsection (2) provides definitions of the key terms including 
                                                 
51. Pallin v. Singer, Civ. A. No. 2:93–CV–202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996). 
52. For other controversial patents contributing to the debate, see Peschel, supra note 45, at 305.   
53. In fact, the bills were introduced during the litigation of the Pallin case. See id. at 304; Havins, 
supra note 45, at 54. 
54. The following bills were introduced: H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995) (to prohibit issuance of 
medical or surgical procedure patents); H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. § 619 (1996) (to restrict funds for 
medical and surgical procedure patents and explicitly define medical and surgical procedures while 
adding “biological process” exception in response to criticism from the biotechnology industry); S. 1334, 
104th Cong. (1995) (to provide patent infringement exemption to physicians); S. 2105, 104th Cong. 
(1996) (similar to Senate Bill 1334).  
55. The American Medical Association (AMA) House of Delegates condemned medical and 
surgical procedure patents, and the American Academy of Ophthalmology urged enactment of 
legislation to exempt those patents. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 
77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 651–52 (1995). 
56. One of the strongest sources of opposition was the biotechnology industry, as they rely on 
the patent system for innovation and development. The industry expressed strong concern regarding H.R. 
1127. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act and Inventor Protection Act of 1995: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 92–100 (1995) (statement of Dr. Frank Baldino, Jr., President and CEO, Cephalon, Inc.). 
57. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996). 
58. This was an unusual legislative process for a significant provision. See 142 CONG. REC. 
26,639 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“This measure was added notwithstanding the fact that there 
were no Senate hearings, and over the objections of myself, the chairman of the Finance Committee and 
the U.S. Trade Representative. It is an unprecedented change to our patent code . . . .”). 
59. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–67 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)). 
60. “With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that constitutes 
an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not 
apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical 
activity.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2012).  
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“medical practitioner”61 and “related health care entity.”62 The definition of 
“medical activity” is provided in subsection (A) as “the performance of a 
medical or surgical procedure on a body,”63 which also lists three exceptions 
to the protected medical activity: 
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter in violation of such patent, 
(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter64 in 
violation of such patent, or 
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.65  
The exception of biotechnology patents was a response to the opposition of 
the biotechnology industry, which voiced concerns regarding the potential 
negative impact of differential treatment of medical procedure patents.66 
However, despite the inclusion of this exception, the provision does not 
provide a definition for the term “biotechnology patent.”  
Subsection (3) further limits the scope of immunity by stating that the 
provision: 
does not apply to the activities of any person, or employee or agent 
of such person . . . , who is engaged in the commercial development, 
manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy 
or clinical laboratory services . . . .67  
                                                 
61. “[A]ny natural person who is licensed by a State to provide the medical activity described in 
subsection (c)(1) or who is acting under the direction of such person in the performance of the medical 
activity.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(B). 
62. “[A]n entity with which a medical practitioner has a professional affiliation under which the 
medical practitioner performs the medical activity, including but not limited to a nursing home, hospital, 
university, medical school, health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.” 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(C). 
63. The definition of “body” is provided in § 287(c)(2)(E) as “a human body, organ or cadaver, 
or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly relating to the treatment of 
humans.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(E).  
64. [T]he term ‘patented use of a composition of matter’ does not include a claim for a method 
of performing a medical or surgical procedure on a body that recites the use of a composition 
of matter where the use of that composition of matter does not directly contribute to 
achievement of the objective of the claimed method.  
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(F).  
65. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A).  
66. See supra note 56.  
67. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(3) (emphasis added). The subsection further defines the covered activities 
as: 
(A) directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or 
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition or matter or the provision of pharmacy 
or clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a physician’s 
office), and 
(B) regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Public Health Service Act, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/4
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Therefore, researchers are not exempt from patent infringement liability 
under this provision.   
B. Case Law Interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) 
Albeit enacted in 1996, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) has only been cited in five 
cases to date.68 Among those cases, only Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc.,69 
Viveve, Inc. v. Thermigen, LLC, 70  and Lamson v. United States 71  have 
interpreted parts of the statute. 72  In Emtel, the patent holder of a 
“telemedicine” method patent “using videoconferencing to allow a 
physician to communicate with a medical caregiver and patient in a remote 
healthcare facility” 73  sued telemedicine support providers for patent 
infringement when physicians under contract with the providers diagnosed 
medical conditions and provided treatment instructions to medical 
caregivers at remote locations. The defendants moved for summary 
judgment claiming immunity under § 287(c). 74  The district court 
determined that the alleged infringing activity, which was remote diagnosis 
and treatment instructions, qualified as “performance of a medical or 
surgical procedure on a body” under § 287(c)75 and the defendants qualified 
as “related health care entities” because the contract between the defendants 
and physicians governed the medical service. 76  However, the court 
ultimately held that the medical activity did not infringe the patent claims.77 
In Viveve, the issue was whether a physician’s alleged infringing acts fell 
under the § 287(c)(3) “commercial development” or “sale” exception when 
                                                 
or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act. 
Id. 
68. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam); 
Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Lamson v. United States, 117 Fed. 
Cl. 755 (2014); Viveve, Inc. v. Thermigen, LLC, No. 2:16–CV–1189–JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60477 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525-SLR-SRF, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70403 (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2018). 
69. 583 F. Supp. 2d at 811. 
70. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60477. 
71. 117 Fed. Cl. at 755. 
72. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings does not concern § 287(c) but rather simply cites the statute in 
dissent as an example of limiting the liability of medical profession. 548 U.S. at 138 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). In Johns Hopkins Univ., the judgment refers to § 287(c) when addressing the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment alleging that there was no direct infringement under § 271 and the doctors 
are immune under § 287(c). 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70403, at *36–37. The court decided that, as there 
was no direct infringement, § 287(c) does not apply “because they are not being sued in the first instance.” 
Id. at *40. 
73. 583 F. Supp. 2d at 814.  
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 823–24.  
76. Id. at 824–25. 
77. Id. at 825–26. 
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he appeared on a television show and performed the method claimed by the 
allegedly infringed patent and marketed the device and procedure.78 The 
court held that the medical activity did qualify as “directly related to the 
commercial development” or “sale,”79 and therefore, the physician did not 
qualify for exemption from infringement liability.80 And, in Lamson, it was 
determined that the United States could be protected from patent 
infringement liability by § 287(c) immunity81 under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.82 
There are no cases, however, that address the interpretation of the term 
“biotechnology patent.”83  
C. Exemption from CAR-T Patent Infringement Liability Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(c)  
Would a physician, researcher, or academic institution using the CAR-T 
therapy in a small-scale clinical trial be exempt from infringement liability 
under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)? The researchers involved in the clinical trial 
would not qualify for exemption under § 287(c) because of the § 287(c)(3) 
exception. 84  However, would the physician or academic institution still 
qualify for the exemption? First, they clearly satisfy the status requirement 
under §287(c)(2)(B) and §287(c)(2)(C) as “medical practitioner” 85  and 
“related health care entity,”86 respectively.87 Then, the issue is whether their 
alleged infringing act is “medical activity” under § 287(c)(2)(A) without 
being disqualified as one (or more) of the three exceptions.88 Given the large 
number of CAR-T patents,89 the analysis will focus on the patents involved 
in the two FDA approved CAR-T therapies.90 
There are two early patents behind Novartis’s CAR-T therapy, one of 
which Novartis licensed from the University of Pennsylvania (Penn) in 
August 201291—U.S. Patent No. 7,638,325 (‘325 patent)92—and the other 
which Novartis eventually licensed from Juno Therapeutics Inc. in 2015 
                                                 
78. Viveve, Inc. v. Thermigen, LLC, No. 2:16–CV–1189–JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60477, 
at *6–8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017).  
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(3)(A). 
80. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60477, at *10–14. 
81. Lamson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 755, 761–63 (2014). 
82. “In the absence of statutory restriction, any defense available to a private party is equally 
available to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498 note (2012) (1948 Act). 
83. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
84. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
85. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(B). 
86. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(C). 
87. See supra notes 61–62. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65. 
89. See supra note 29. 
90. See supra Part I.A.  
91. Kurt Orzeck, supra note 28. 
92. (filed Jan. 3, 2003) (issued Dec. 29, 2009). 
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after a settlement following a patent dispute93—U.S. Patent No. 8,399,645 
(‘645 patent).94 The ‘325 patent claims an engineered T cell for long-term 
expansion and activation, 95  and the ‘645 patent describes the genetic 
sequence of a chimeric receptor containing a specific signaling domain96 as 
well as the related vector97 and host cell.98 Based on the claim language, 
these two patents are composition of matter patents99 and would fall under 
the exception to the protected medical activity exemption under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(c)(2)(A)(i) “use of . . . composition of matter.” Therefore, § 287(c) 
would not provide immunity for alleged patent infringement related to either 
the ‘325 or ‘645 patent.  
Given the exclusive licensing agreement between Novartis and Penn,100 
several key patents owned by Penn and/or Novartis are also noteworthy, as 
they claim both composition and method. 101  U.S. Patent No. 9,499,629 
(‘629 patent) is representative of such patents, and the relevant claims are: 
1. A method for stimulating a T cell-mediated immune response to a 
target cell population or tissue in a human, the method comprising 
administering to the human an effective amount of a cell genetically 
modified to express a CAR . . . , wherein the cell is from a human 
having cancer. 
                                                 
93. Ashley Jean Yeager, Patent Disputes Bring Immunotherapy Technology and Patent Review 
Process into Focus, GEN (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/car-t-in-the-
courts/77900974 [https://perma.cc/6N7G-JJR9]. 
94. (filed July 12, 2012) (issued Mar. 19, 2013). 
95. The pertinent claim provides:  
1. A K562 cell engineered to induce long term expansion of T cells, wherein said engineered 
K562 cell comprises on its surface: an anti-CD3 antibody loaded onto a human Fcγ receptor, . 
. . and wherein said K562 cell is further genetically modified to express the co-stimulatory 
molecule, 4-1BBL. 
‘325 Patent col. 52 ll. 20–32. 
96. The pertinent claim provides:  
1. A polynucleotide encoding a chimeric receptor comprising: (a) an extracellular ligand-
binding domain comprising an anti-CD19 single chain variable fragment (scFv) domain; (b) a 
transmembrane domain; and (c) a cytoplasmic domain comprising a 4-1BB signaling domain 
and a CD3ζ signaling domain. 
‘645 Patent col. 45 ll. 13–18. 
97. ‘645 Patent col. 45 ll. 19–27. 
98. ‘645 Patent col. 45 ll. 28–36.  
99. The United States Supreme Court has defined “composition of matter” as including “all 
compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of 
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.” Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 
(D.D.C. 1957)). 
100. University of Pennsylvania and Novartis Form Alliance to Expand Use of Personalized T 
Cell Therapy for Cancer Patients, PENN MED. (Aug. 6, 2012), https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/ne 
ws-releases/2012/august/university-of-pennsylvania-and [https://perma.cc/AD63-Z27R]. 
101. U.S. Patent No. 9,499,629; U.S. Patent No. 9,446,105; U.S. Patent No. 9,394,368; U.S. Patent 
No. 9,328,156. 
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2. A method of providing an anti-tumor immunity in a human, the 
method comprising administering to the human an effective amount 
of a cell genetically modified to express a CAR . . . , wherein the cell 
is from a human having cancer. 
. . .  
5. A method of treating a human with chronic lymphocytic leukemia 
or acute lymphocytic leukemia, the method comprising administering 
to the human a T cell genetically engineered to express a CAR . . . , 
wherein the T cell is from a human having cancer.102 
While the ‘629 patent is not a composition of matter patent, the question 
remains as to whether it can be considered as a biotechnology patent which 
would render the alleged infringement of the patent disqualified for liability 
immunity under § 287(c).  
As stated above, the statute does not explicitly define the term 
“biotechnology patent.”103 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court provided 
that “[i]n patent law, as in all statutory construction, ‘[u]nless otherwise 
defined, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.”’”104 In dictionaries, “biotechnology” is defined as “the 
manipulation (as through genetic engineering) of living organisms or their 
components to produce useful usually commercial products”105 or “[t]he 
exploitation of biological processes for industrial and other purposes, 
especially the genetic manipulation of microorganisms for the production 
of antibiotics, hormones, etc.” 106  Therefore, it appears that a patent 
involving genetic engineering technology will likely be considered a 
“biotechnology patent.” 
Another canon of statutory interpretation instructs that “[a] term 
appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way 
each time it appears.”107 Prior to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA), 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) contained the term “biotechnological process” 
                                                 
102. ‘629 Patent col. 91 ll. 19–29, 51–59.  
103. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
104. 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
182 (1981)). 
105. Biotechnology, DICTIONARY BY MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/di 
ctionary/biotechnology [https://perma.cc/D6HG-AT8Q].  
106. Biotechnology, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definiti 
on/biotechnology [https://perma.cc/JMB9-LYYF]. 
107. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994). However, this is not a strong presumption 
and can be overridden based on statutory context and legislative history. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1997) (term “employees” means “current employees” only in some sections 
of Title VII of Civil Rights Act, but includes “former employees” in other sections); Gen. Dynamics 
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596–97 (2004) (in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
the word “age” means “old age” in the term “age discrimination,” while it is used in the primary sense 
elsewhere in the act). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/4
  
 
 
 
 
2018] PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 635 
 
 
 
  
which was defined to include genetic engineering. 108  In addition, the 
legislative history, another key source for statutory interpretation, pointed 
to the pre-AIA § 103(b) provision and also provided that “biotechnology 
patents” “include[] a patent on a process of making or using biological 
materials, including treatment using those materials, where those materials 
have been manipulated ex vivo at the cellular or molecular level.”109  
The claims of the ‘629 patent include a process of genetic engineering or 
modification. They also describe “a process of making or using biological 
material,”110 which is the creation of genetically modified T cells expressing 
a CAR and their use for treatment of cancer; “treatment using those 
materials,”111 which is the treatment of types of cancers such as CLL or ALL; 
and the “materials [that are] manipulated ex vivo at the cellular or molecular 
level,”112 as T cells from cancer patients are engineered ex vivo to express 
the CAR. Therefore, the CAR-T method patents113 appear to fall under the 
“biotechnology patent” exception. In consequence, § 287(c) does not 
provide exemption from liability of alleged infringement of such patents.   
Meanwhile, the key patent behind Kite’s CAR-T therapy is U.S. Patent 
No. 7,741,465 (‘465 patent).114 The patent covers a DNA sequence of a 
chimeric T cell receptor,115 an expression vector comprising the chimeric 
DNA,116 and isolated lymphocyte transformed with the expression vector or 
chimeric DNA.117 Like the ‘325 and ‘645 patents, the ‘465 patent is also a 
                                                 
108. [T]he term “biotechnological process” means— 
(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism 
to— 
 (i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, 
 (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence, 
or 
 (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said 
organism; 
(B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a 
monoclonal antibody; and 
(C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or (B), or 
a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(2) (2006) (amended 2011). 
109. 142 CONG. REC. 26,173 (1996). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Similar analysis can be done for the other patents in supra note 101. 
114. (filed July 2, 1993) (issued June 22, 2010). See Press Release, Kite Pharma, Inc., U.S. Patent 
Office to Confirm Kite’s Seminal Eshhar CAR-T Patent (June 28, 2017), https://www.gilead.com/news/ 
press-releases/2017/6/us-patent-office-to-confirm-kites-seminal-eshhar-cart-patent [https://perma.cc/H 
74E-7L8E]. 
115. ‘465 Patent col. 35–38 (claims 1–16).  
116. ‘465 Patent col. 38 l. 20–21 (claim 17).  
117. ‘465 Patent col. 38 l. 22–33 (claims 18–20).  
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composition of matter patent and, therefore, there will be no liability 
exemption from infringing said patent under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) as well.   
D. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) Is Incompatible with the Personalized Medicine Era 
Providing no shield of immunity for physicians, researchers, or academic 
institutions that might become liable for patent infringement from using 
CAR-T therapy for novel treatments,118 the medical procedure exemption is 
incompatible with the personalized medicine era. This incompatibility is 
accentuated when compared to international practices. The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),119 to which 
the United States is a signatory, creates a minimum international standard 
for intellectual property protection. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) is considered an 
attempt at TRIPs compliance, where the pertinent TRIPs provision provides 
that “[m]embers may also exclude from patentability . . . diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.”120 
Prior commentaries have criticized § 287(c) for being over-inclusive for 
TRIPs compliance.121 This Note, however, argues that § 287(c) is under-
inclusive when viewed in light of the CAR-T therapy. In fact, under Article 
53 of the European Patent Convention (EPC), “methods for treatment of the 
human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods 
practised on the human or animal body”122 are not patentable, keeping in 
line with the true intention of TRIPs Article 27. In fact, so far, there are no 
method patents on the medical procedure of the CAR-T therapy granted by 
the European Patent Office (EPO). 123  Due to the discrepancy, while 
European patients will be able to benefit from innovative usages of the 
CAR-T therapy and related personalized medicine therapies, U.S. patients 
might have less opportunity for experimental CAR-T therapy or other 
innovative therapies given the providers’ potential patent infringement 
liability due to the inadequate protection of § 287(c). 
In line with the argument that 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) is under-inclusive, 
academic commentary has proposed to revise the provision to allow 
                                                 
118. See supra Part II.C. 
119. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
120. Id. art. 27. 
121. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patent, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601 (2000); Fariba Sirjani & Dariush Keyhani, 35 U.S.C. § 
287(c): Language Slightly Beyond Intent, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13 (2005). 
122. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art. 53, Oct. 5, 
1973 (amended Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ar53.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/YQ6K-UPMP]. 
123. There is one EPO patent on the modified T cell, which is a composition of matter patent. 
European Patent No. 2 649 086 (issued July 19, 2017). 
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“genetic diagnostics” as an exempted medical activity.124 However, such 
piecemeal modification of a statute has a potential to distort its legislative 
purpose and operation. Therefore, unless the biotechnology patent 
exception is excluded, the medical procedure exemption provision does not 
have a role in the personalized medicine era.125  
III. EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT  
An alternative defense that a physician, researcher, or academic 
institution providing the CAR-T immunotherapy could use against an 
alleged patent infringement lawsuit regarding CAR-T patents is the 
experimental use exemption. This Part starts with an overview of the two 
branches of the exemption: the common law experimental use doctrine and 
the statutory experimental use exemption codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
It proceeds to the analysis of whether either type of the exemption would 
provide immunity to patent infringement from the use of CAR-T therapy 
and concludes by arguing for a broad experimental use doctrine for the 
personalized medicine era.  
A. Common Law Experimental Use Doctrine 
The experimental use exemption to patent infringement can find its roots 
in Whittemore v. Cutter.126 Though the case itself did not involve a claim of 
experimental use,127 Justice Story stated that patent infringement did not 
intend to punish an alleged infringer who conducted “merely . . . 
philosophical experiments.”128 Early cases applying the experimental use 
exemption focused on financial motive as the determining factor. In Sawin 
v. Guild, citing Whittemore, Justice Story held that the alleged patent 
infringers were not liable because they did not have “an intent to use for 
profit” but rather had “the mere purpose of philosophical experiment[] or to 
ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification.”129 And, in 1861, the 
                                                 
124. See Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) 
to Allow Health Care Providers to Examine Their Patients’ DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 471, 503 (2002). 
125. It is also worth emphasizing that 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) provides exemption from infringement 
liability but not the infringement claim itself. “With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of  
a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of sections 
281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is a 
weak mechanism of immunity overall.  
126. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).  
127. It involved an alleged infringement of a patent for a playing cards-manufacturing machine. 
Id. at 1123. 
128. Id. at 1121. 
129. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). This is in line with 
the spirit of patent law allowing patents on “any new and useful improvement,” 35 U.S.C. § 101 
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court in Poppenhusen v. Falke clarified the doctrine by providing that “an 
experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a 
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an 
infringement of the rights of the patentee,”130 which became the current test 
for the experimental use exemption. Prior to 1984, 131  the scope of 
experimental use doctrine was unclear, and the court exempted inventors 
who experimented on patented technology to invent patentable 
improvements.132  
As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) 
gradually narrowed the scope of the experimental use doctrine based on 
commercial motives,133 it also started to emphasize the business interest of 
the alleged infringer in determining whether the experimental use 
exemption applied. In a 1984 case, Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., involving a pharmaceutical drug company, the Federal 
Circuit held that the experimental use exception is “truly narrow.”134 In 
Roche, a drug company imported and began running tests on a patented drug 
to obtain FDA approval for production and marketing of the drug in the U.S. 
market.135 The court held that “[e]xperimental use is not a defense”136 to 
alleged infringement “for the purpose of furthering the legitimate business 
interests of the infringer.” 137 It emphasized that the infringer’s activities 
were “solely for business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” 138  and could not be 
                                                 
(emphasis added), thus authorizing patentable experiments to improve existing inventions. See also In 
re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“[E]ncouragement of improvements on prior inventions 
is a major contribution of the patent system and the vast majority of patents are issued on 
improvements.”). In contrast, copyright law allows only the original copyright holder to obtain 
copyrights on subsequent works or improvements based on original work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see 
Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 2000).  
130. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). 
131. This is the year when Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 
(Fed. Cir. 1989), was decided. See infra text accompanying notes 134–139.  
132. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (uses “for testing 
and for experimental purposes” are not infringement); Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 
390, 393 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883) (making a machine to illustrate an improvement did not infringe the 
pioneering patent). 
133. See, e.g., Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 156 F.2d 29 
(2d Cir. 1946) (experimental use is not infringement because the defendant had not “sold any” of the 
experimental product); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va. 1937) 
(experimental use of a patented marble-making machine is not infringement because “marbles were not 
commercially sold”). 
134. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863. 
135. Id. at 860. 
136. Id. at 863 (alteration in original) (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 
1976)). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
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considered experimental use when they had “definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes.”139 
More recently, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the experimental use 
exemption is indeed “very narrow and strictly limited.”140 In Madey v. Duke 
University, a patent infringement suit involving a university and one of its 
former professors,141 the court used this language and provided that “so long 
as the [alleged infringing] act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, 
or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” 142 the experimental use exemption 
does not apply. Emphasizing that the “non-profit, educational status”143 of 
the alleged infringer, Duke University,144 was not determinative, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the district court’s “broad conception of . . . experimental 
use”145 which included uses for research, academic, experimental, or non-
profit purposes.146 Instead, it emphasized that “major research universities, 
such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no 
commercial application”147 and that “these projects unmistakably further 
the institution’s legitimate business objectives, including educating and 
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects” 148  and 
“increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, 
students and faculty.”149  
B. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1): Statutory Experimental Use Exemption  
While the scope of the common law experimental use exemption has 
been extremely limited by the Federal Circuit’s practice, the statutory 
exemption provided in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) has been interpreted relatively 
broadly. 150  Six months after the Federal Circuit’s Roche decision, 151 
Congress overturned it by enacting the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
                                                 
139. Id. 
140. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
141. Id. at 1352–53.  
142. Id. at 1362.  
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1361. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1362. 
148. Id (emphasis added). 
149. Id. 
150. See generally Gregory N. Pate, Note, Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 253, 269–70 (2002). It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the scope 
of the common law experimental use exemption.   
151. Roche Prods., Co. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
640 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:623 
 
 
 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 152 
Codifying the experimental use exemption, 153  § 271(e)(1) provides 
immunity to patent infringement “solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”154 Six years later, in 1990, 
the Supreme Court held that § 271(e)(1) provided immunity for tests on not 
only drugs but also medical devices when tests were performed to generate 
information for FDA regulations.155  
The Court interpreted the statutory experimental use exemption even 
more broadly in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.156 In Merck, the 
Supreme Court held that § 271(e)(1) immunity can include “either (1) 
experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA 
submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that are not 
ultimately submitted to the FDA.”157 It recognized that drug development is 
a “process of trial and error”158 and that there is no way of knowing whether 
a drug candidate will ultimately be successful or whether an experiment or 
finding will be submitted to the FDA.159 While emphasizing that Congress 
did not intend to limit § 271(e)(1) immunity solely to the development of 
information for submission to the FDA, the Court concluded that the 
“reasonably related”160 requirement should be read broadly.161  
                                                 
152. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1)). For academic commentary, see Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 25 (2001); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 932–33 (2006).  
153. The statutory provision is also referred to as the “safe harbor provision.” Alicia A. Russo & 
Jason Johnson, Research Use Exemptions to Patent Infringement for Drug Discovery and Development 
in the United States, 5 COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSP. MED., Feb. 2015, at 4–5, http://perspectivesinmed 
icine.cshlp.org/content/5/2/a020933. 
154. 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). The full text of the provision provides: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States 
or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary 
biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and 
the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, 
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic 
manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission 
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products. 
Id. 
155. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668–69 (1990). 
156. 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
157. Id. at 206. 
158. Id.  
159. Id. 
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). 
161. Merck, 545 U.S. at 207. 
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C. Exemption from CAR-T Patent Infringement as Experimental Use 
Whether a physician, researcher, or academic institution could be 
exempted from alleged infringement of CAR-T patent(s) under the 
experimental use doctrine would depend on the court’s analysis of the 
nature and purpose of the alleged infringing use. Under the current common 
law experimental use doctrine, the use of CAR-T therapy might not satisfy 
its narrow conception.162 First, the use is clearly not “for amusement, to 
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”163 and, therefore, 
does not satisfy the Federal Circuit’s narrow experimental use test. 164 
Secondly, while it can be reasonably argued that the use of CAR-T therapy 
is not solely for profit,165 the courts might interpret it as serving a “legitimate 
business interest” in light of Madey v. Duke University.166 CAR-T therapies, 
especially experimental therapies that would be liable for patent 
infringement challenges, are mostly (and will likely continue to be) 
performed at academic medical centers, and these alleged infringers 167 
could be considered as (or part of) an academic institution similar to Duke 
in Madey. It is possible that the courts could view performing an 
experimental therapy as part of a legitimate business interest of an academic 
medical center, which includes increasing the status of the institution.168 
Indeed, it has been commented that the Madey ruling effectively prevents 
academic institutions from using the experimental use exemption as a 
defense for patent infringement.169 However, while Madey involved the use 
of laser technology of which the primary purpose is research,170 the use of 
CAR-T therapy has the primary purpose of saving patient lives. And this is 
a factor that has never been considered by the court in its analysis of the 
common law experimental use doctrine.171  
Meanwhile, under the broad interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—the 
statutory experimental use exemption—the experimental CAR-T therapy, 
particularly in the form of a clinical trial, can be considered to have a 
“reasonable relation” to FDA submission even though the CAR-T therapy 
                                                 
162. See supra Part III.A. 
163. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
164. Id. 
165. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). 
166. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
167. This would include the physicians, researchers, and academic institution involved in the 
clinical trial.  
168. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
169. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018, 1019 (2003). 
170. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361–63. 
171. See infra Part III.D. for further analysis and arguments. 
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might not ultimately be successful or submitted to the FDA.172 In Merck, the 
Supreme Court seemingly allowed preclinical experiments to fall under the 
§ 271(e)(1) exemption by stating:  
At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that 
a patented compound may work, through a particular biological 
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the 
compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to 
include in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related” 
to the “development and submission of information under . . . Federal 
law.”173 
Yet, even though the Supreme Court provided a broad interpretation of 
§ 271(e)(1), it did not allow a loose interpretation. It stated,  
Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed 
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief 
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the 
researcher intends to induce, is surely not “reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information” to the FDA.174  
The problem is, however, that the line between basic science and 
preclinical research is not entirely bright.175 This is particularly the case in 
research during the development of many gene therapies and personalized 
medical therapies. Interestingly, in Merck, the Supreme Court explicitly 
refused to rule on whether “research tools” would be exempt from 
infringement under § 271(e)(1).176 While no case has explicitly addressed 
the exemption of research tools under § 271(e)(1), in Proveris Scientific 
Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,177 the Federal Circuit ruled that the § 271(e)(1) 
exemption did not apply to a newly developed spray apparatus, which was 
alleged to infringe on an existing patented spray apparatus.178 The court 
explained that although the allegedly infringing apparatus was used in 
several FDA submissions as a delivery device for drug products, the device 
itself was not subject to FDA approval and, thus, not protected under § 
271(e)(1).179 Therefore, while the alleged infringing acts in CAR-T clinical 
trials might be considered exempt from patent infringement under § 
271(e)(1), the use and experiments of “research tools” related to the 
                                                 
172. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).  
173. Id. at 207 (quoting § 271(e)(1)). 
174. Id. at 205–06. 
175. See Russo & Johnson, supra note 154, at 7. 
176. Merck, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7. 
177. 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
178. Id. at 1258.  
179. Id. at 1259, 1265–66. 
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development of the novel CAR-T therapy might not qualify for exemption 
under § 271(e)(1) because those uses could be deemed too remote from 
FDA submission or review.180   
D. Argument for a Broad Experimental Use Doctrine for the Personalized 
Medicine Era  
1. Support for Broad Experimental Use Doctrine 
Many academic commentaries have supported a broader experimental 
use exemption doctrine. 181  In particular, Professor Rebecca Eisenberg 
pointed out the blurring line between “basic and applied research” 182 in 
biotechnology as a core basis for a broader experimental use exemption. 
This rationale can be translated to patented technologies, which are forming 
the core of personalized medicine, where it is becoming even harder to 
demarcate the line between basic science research, translational research, 
preclinical research, and clinical research and practice. In fact, most major 
foreign jurisdictions have explicitly adopted broad experimental use 
exemptions to infringement,183 which are codified in statutory provisions.184  
                                                 
180. In fact, the issue of the treatment of “research tools” by the experimental use exemption has 
been the subject of a number of academic commentaries. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 152, at 54–65; 
David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research 
Tools by Implementing a Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL. L. REV. 993 (2004). 
181. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10; Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, 
and Scientific Progress, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 667 (1997); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public 
Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived? , 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 
(2004); Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on Ice, 
Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2006); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental 
Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and 
Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Hoffman, supra note 180.  
182. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1018. 
183. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE § 60.24 (2017) 
(U.K.), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/  
file/646801/Mopp-Oct-2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/6S9P-3VDU] (noting that experimental use exception 
extends to commercial experiments and “[t]rials carried out in order to discover something unknown or 
to test a hypothesis or even in order to find out whether something which is known to work in specific 
conditions will work in different conditions”); Micro Chems. Ltd. v. Smith Kline & French Inter-
American Corp. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 506, 519 (Can.) (Canadian Supreme Court confirming a broad 
experimental use exemption by holding that “[p]atent rights were never granted to prevent persons of 
ingenuity exercising their talents in a fair way”); Yusuke Hiraki, Patents: Infringement—Experimental 
Use Exempted for Clinical Trials, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. N140 (1999) (Japan) (explaining the 
broad interpretation of experimental used exemption by Japanese Supreme Court). 
184. See, e.g., Patent Act 1977, c. 37, § 60(5)(b), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra 
note 183 (providing defense to patent infringement for actions “done for experimental purposes relating 
to the subject-matter of the invention”); Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] I at § 11.2, last amended by Gesetz [G], Act of Oct. 19, 2013 BGBL I at 3830, 
art. 1 (Ger.), https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=401424 [http://perma.cc/YDZ5-6RFB] 
(“The effect of a patent shall not extend to . . . acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-
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2. Arguments Against Broad Experimental Use Doctrine  
Of course, there is support for preserving the status quo of the Federal 
Circuit’s narrow experimental use doctrine. 185  Among the traditional 
arguments against a broad experimental use exemption,186 the key concern 
is reducing incentives for innovation. 187 While protecting the patentee’s 
right and maintaining the economic incentive for innovation are crucial 
functions of the patent system, these features are important mainly for 
industries that largely depend on patent protection for innovation.188 On the 
other hand, there are alternative incentives for innovation which include the 
prospect of prestige, prizes for invention, and academic rewards in the form 
of tenure or promotion. 189  Perhaps more importantly, inventors can be 
motivated by the desire to do good, such as saving lives or curing diseases, 
and can also be supported ex ante through government grants or university 
funding.190 These latter sets of incentives are prominently influential in the 
fields of medicine and biotechnology.191 Therefore, in considering patents 
related to medical therapies, broadening the experimental use exemption 
would not have an enormously detrimental effect on innovation in the field.   
Additionally, it could also be argued that the realistic possibility of a 
CAR-T patent infringement lawsuit against physicians and academic 
institutions is low, as the patent owner might be reluctant to bring a lawsuit 
against physicians who are saving patients’ lives. However, academic 
                                                 
matter of the patented invention.”); JAPAN PATENT OFFICE ASIA-PAC. INDUS. PROP. CTR., PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION IN JAPAN 13 (2016), https://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e/kokusai_e/train 
ing/textbook/pdf/Patent_Infringement_Litigation_in_Japan(2016).pdf [http://perma.cc/U6W8-Q8ZX] 
(explaining Article 69(1), the experimental use exemption, of the Japanese Patent Act).  
185. See, e.g., Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety 
of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE. L.J. 2169 (1991); Rowe, supra note 152; Alan Devlin, Restricting 
Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2009). 
186. For a detailed analysis of arguments against a broad experimental use exemption and 
corresponding responses to each argument, see Mueller, supra note 152, at 41–54 (addressing the 
arguments of incentive function of exclusivity, transformative versus commercial purpose, research tool 
patentability and claim scope, constitutional implications, and conventional U.S. norms of patent 
exclusivity).  
187. See Karp, supra note 185, at 2181–82; Mueller, supra note 152, at 41–42. 
188. See Karp, supra note 185, at 2181. 
189. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1586 (2003).  
190. See id. at 1586–87. 
191. See id. at 1587 n.30. 
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institutions are frequently sued,192 and as long as there is a patent owner, the 
threat of a patent infringement suit exists.   
3. Personalized Medicine Presents a Novel Case for a Broad 
Experimental Use Doctrine 
In addition to the traditional factors of “amusement, . . . idle curiosity, . . . 
philosophical inquiry”193 and “profit” or “legitimate business objectives,”194 
this Note proposes another factor for experimental use exemption analysis 
in the personalized medicine era—clinical experiments to find new cures. 
Indeed, other countries have already allowed broader experimental use 
exemptions, particularly concerning clinical trials.195 The Federal Supreme 
Court of Germany interpreted the statutory experimental use exemption 
provision in German patent law196 to cover allegedly infringing activity of 
clinical trials of a patented drug, where the trials were conducted to find new 
applications for the drug. 197  Furthermore, the court also added that the 
experimental use exemption would apply even if the alleged infringing 
activity would lead to a new patent application by the alleged infringer.198  
Conceptually, Professor Maureen O’Rourke’s argument for adopting 
copyright law’s fair use exemption199 into patent law200 can be considered 
in line with adding the “clinical experiment” factor to broaden the 
experimental use doctrine. Professor O’Rouke’s proposal has been 
interpreted as a version of broad experimental use exemption, accepting 
alleged infringing uses as experimental uses when they are in the context of 
research or other socially valuable activities.201 Following this argument, as 
                                                 
192. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Trs. of the Univ. of 
Pa. v. St. Jude Children’s Research Hosp., No. 13–1502, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193965 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
13, 2014). 
193. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
194. Id. 
195. See generally Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, Research Exemption/Experimental Use 
in the European Union: Patents Do Not Block the Progress of Science, 5 COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSP. 
MED., Feb. 2015, http://perspectivesinmedicine.cshlp.org/content/5/2/a020941. 
196. “The effects of the patent shall not extend to acts performed for experimental purposes 
relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention.” Wolfgang von Meibom & Johann Pitz, 
Experimental Use and Compulsory Licence Under German Patent Law, PAT. WORLD, June–July 1997, 
at 27 (quoting Section 11, No. 2 of German Patent Act of 1981). 
197. Id. at 29. 
198. Id. 
199. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)). 
200. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177 (2000).  
201. Rowe, supra note 152, at 950. The author, however, subsequently criticizes the proposal 
based on the legal ambiguities of the fair use doctrine in copyright law itself. Id. at 951. 
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clinical trials leading to novel therapies and saved lives are undisputedly 
socially valuable activities, they should be considered an experimental use.  
It has also been previously argued that the experimental use exemption 
should be broadened to include patented biomedical research tools, as the 
increased transaction costs would jeopardize the development of new 
therapeutic drugs or devices crucial for health.202 An even stronger case can 
be made for research tools related to clinical experiments (or trials) which 
are in closer proximity to health care. Therefore, the inherently experimental 
nature of personalized medicine treatments, such as the CAR-T therapy, 
strongly calls for a broader experimental use doctrine.  
CONCLUSION 
Due to its fundamentally dynamic nature being intertwined with 
innovation and “adapt[ing] flexibly to both old and new technologies,”203 
patent law has often been discussed in conjunction with “paradigm shifts”204 
in the progress of science. 205  Regardless of whether patents do indeed 
induce paradigm shifts, patent law should not ignore a paradigm shift that 
is patently in progress. The era of personalized medicine is revolutionizing 
the way we conceptualize medicine and science, marking a true paradigm 
shift. While a radical change in patent law might be unrealistic and even 
unnecessary, the patent system of the new era should at least ensure 
adequate protection or defense for those whose innocent and well-intended 
use of a patented technology renders them vulnerable to potential patent 
infringement lawsuits.  
As evident from this analysis using CAR-T therapy as a case study, the 
current patent regime leaves the inherently experimental personalized 
medical therapies vulnerable to patent infringement claims and liabilities. 
Among the two available sources of immunity from patent infringement or 
infringement liability, the medical procedure exemption provision, 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c), is incompatible with personalized medicine due to its 
excepting biotechnology patents from exemption. 206  Regarding the two 
types of the experimental use exemption, the Federal Circuit has applied the 
common law doctrine in a narrow manner, and while the statutory 
experimental use exemption, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), has been applied 
                                                 
202. See Mueller, supra note 152, at 66. 
203. Burk & Lemley, supra note 189, at 1576. 
204. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Otto Neurath 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970). 
205. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1051–55; Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and 
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 686–94 (2004). 
206. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
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broadly,207 the extent of its reach is unclear.208 Thus, the new paradigm of 
personalized medicine provides additional support to the long-standing 
arguments for broadening the experimental use doctrine.209 The traditional 
conception of the experimental use analysis confined to “philosophical 
inquiry”210 and “legitimate business objectives”211 is no longer viable. The 
personalized medicine era calls for a broader experimental use exemption 
that considers the true nature of clinical experiments and trials and their 
social value.  
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207. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668–69 (1990); Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005). 
208.  See supra text accompanying notes 174-180. 
209. See supra note 181. 
210. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
211. Id. 
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